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INTRODUCTION
Protection of privacy is an important issue in information policy
making. Sometimes lost sight of, however, in the zeal to protect privacy
on the information superhighway, is that securing one person's privacy
may infringe on another person's freedom of information. Freedom of
information, in the narrow sense used in the United States, generally refers
to free access to government information, but, in a wider sense, freedom
of information is an essential part of freedom of expression.
Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms explicitly recognizes that the right to
* J.D., LL.M., Dr. Jur. (Munich); Vice-President and Associate General Counsel,
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. The views expressed are the Author's and not necessarily those of
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freedom of expression includes the freedom to "receive and impart
information or ideas."' Because Article 8 recognizes a right to protection
of private life,2 the Convention itself poses a dilemma: whether to protect
privacy or freedom of information. As the United Kingdom Data Protection
Registrar recently noted, "[A] balance has to be struck between Articles 8
and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights . . .the right to
private life and freedom of expression." 3
Common business transactions can raise this very issue. In business,
the public interest calls for an open and free flow of information. Positive
duties to disclose pertinent information frequently apply.' American
securities laws are examples of laws that impose obligations to disclose.
Even where no legal disclosure requirements apply, parties have a natural
and understandable desire to want to know something about one another
prior to entering into business relations. Before investing in a business, an
investor may wish to know what success that business has experienced. The
investor may also wish to know what success the principal of the business
has experienced. The potential investor may find it relevant that the
business has only recently emerged from bankruptcy or that the owner had
other businesses that went bankrupt. Should the privacy interests of the
business or its principal permit either one to keep that information
confidential?
According to Professor Reidenberg, "the American legal system
responds incoherently and incompletely to the privacy issues raised by
existing information processing activities in the business community.'" To
state the same conclusion more positively, one might say that the United
States has demonstrated a strong preference for freedom of information. In
the United States there is skepticism about restrictions on the free flow of
information. That skepticism is apparent in one of the earliest U.S. privacy
cases, Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.6 In Roberson, the New
York Court of Appeals rejected the claim that unauthorized use of a per-
1. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, art. 10, para. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230.
2. Id. at art. 8, para. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
3. United Kingdom Data Protection Registrar, Draft European Union General
Directive on Data Protection Common Position of the Council of Ministers Briefing Note
§ 4.2 (Mar. 17, 1995) [hereinafter Briefing Note] (copy on file with the Federal
Communications Law Journal).
4. See generally Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During
Precontractual Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 70 (1993) (discussing such
requirements under U.S., Italian, and German law).
5. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for
Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 199 (1992).
6. Roberson, 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
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son's likeness on a flour package supported a claim to damages. The court
found the claim too great a restriction on third-party comment about
neighbors' activities:
The so-called "right of privacy" is, as the phrase suggests,
founded upon the claim that a man has the right to pass through
this world, if he wills, without having his picture published, his
business enterprises discussed, his successful experiments written
up for the benefit of others, or his eccentricities commented upon
either in handbills, circulars, catalogues, periodicals, or newspa-
pers; and, necessarily, that the things which may not be written
and published of him must not be spoken of him by his neigh-
bors, whether the comment be favorable or otherwise.7
Perhaps because of this skepticism, there are no generally applicable data
protection laws in the United States. The privacy laws that exist are sector
specific, such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act.'
I. THE EU DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE
In Europe, data protection laws of general applicability have been
common for two decades.9 On February 3, 1995, the Council of Ministers
of the European Union adopted a Common Position on a data protection
directive. ° The Common Position went back to proposals first made in
1990" and, in particular, to a proposed directive of the European
7. Id. at 443. The decision in Roberson led the New York state legislature to adopt a
limited, statutory right of privacy. The current version of that statute is N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1681a-1681t (1988).
9. In 1970, the German state of Hesse adopted what is generally considered to be the
world's first data protection law. See Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz as amended Dec. 11,
1988, reprinted with translation in 1 Datenschutz in der Europiiischen Union-Gesetzes-
sammlung/Data Protection in the European Union-The Statutory Provisions (Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden) (Supp. 2, 01) (Apr. 1994).
10. Common Position (EC) Adopted by the Council on 3 Feb. 1995, with a View to
Adopting Directive 94/ /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data. [hereinafter Common Position] (copy on file with the Federal
Communications Law Journal).
11. Commission Communication on the Protection of Individuals in Relation to the
Processing of Personal Data in the Community and Information Security; Proposal for a
Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in Relation to the Processing of
Personal Data; Draft Resolution of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States of the European Communities Meeting within the Council; Commission Declaration
on the Application to the Institutions and Other Bodies of the European Communities of the
Principles Contained in the Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in
Relation to the Processing of Personal Data; Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning
the Protection of Personal Data and Privacy in the Context of Public Digital Telecommuni,
cations Networks, in Particular the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) and Public
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Commission dated October 15, 1992.12 After the European Parliament
made only minor changes in the Common Position, the European Union
adopted the Directive on July 24, 1995.13 A directive, as those familiar
with EU law know, is not directly applicable law; it is a direction to
Member States to enact law. 4 A directive, even when adopted, is thus not
the last word on a subject, particularly if the directive so provides. The
Data Protection Directive balances competing interests both directly, by
mandating certain rules, and indirectly, by permitting Member States to
legislate accordingly. Article 5 recognizes this explicitly when it states:
"Member States shall ... determine more precisely the conditions under
which the processing of personal data is lawful." 5
The Directive identifies two principal objects: protection of the right
of privacy and prevention of obstacles to the free flow of information
within the European Union. Both are named in the Directive's title: On the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data. Article 1(1) states that the object
of the Directive is to "protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of
natural persons, and in particular their right of privacy, with respect to the
processing of personal data."16 Article 1(2) states, "Member States shall
neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of personal data between Member
States for reasons connected with the protection afforded under paragraph
1." 17 In acknowledging privacy, the Directive follows the Convention for
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Data Processing of
Personal Data of the Council of Europe"8 and departs from the United
Digital Mobile Networks; Recommendation for a Council Decision on the Opening of
Negotiations with Regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data; Proposal for a
Council Decision in the Field of Information Security, COM(90)314 final. See also Briefing
Note, supra note 3, § 1.
12. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data,
COM(92)422 final. For a discussion of the 1992 Commission, see James R. Maxeiner,
Business Information and "PersonalData": Some Common-Law ObservationsAbout the EU
Data Protection Directive, 80 IOWA L. REV. 619 (1995).
13. Council Directive of 24 July 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data. [hereinafter
Council Directive] (copy on file with the Federal Communications Law Journal).
14. "A directive shall be binding in its entirety, as to the result to be achieved, upon
each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the
choice of form and methods." Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art.
189, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 78-79.
15. Council Directive, supra note 13, at art. 5.
16. Id. at art. 1, para. 1.
17. Id. at art. 1, para. 2.
18. "The purpose of this convention is to secure in the territory of each Party for every
individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and fundamental
[Vol. 48
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Kingdom's Data Protection Act of 1984.19 The protection that the
Directive provides for the free flow of information is not protection of
freedom of information but protection of commerce in information."
What is significant in judging the Directive's balancing of the
interests of privacy and of freedom of information is what the Directive
does not do. The Directive does not establish a general right of property
in information. It is concerned with processing of information and not with
ownership of information. It gives data subjects certain limited rights and,
more generally, imposes on data controllers obligations in their conduct of
data processing. It does not create intellectual property rights in informa-
tion.
The Directive also does not follow the path taken by some European
countries of establishing a right of "informational self-determination."',
In 1983, the German Constitutional Court recognized a quasi-constitutional
right to "informational self-determination." ' Today, in Germany, while
the federal constitution has yet to include an explicit right of privacy, some
state constitutions do.' For example, the newly adopted constitution of
Thuringia in former East Germany includes a detailed right of privacy
which provides:
Everyone has the right to consideration and protection of his
personality and of his private life. Everyone is entitled to
protection of his personal data. He is entitled to determine the
freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of
personal data relating to him ('data protection')." Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Data Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, art.
1, Europ. T.S. 108.
19. Briefing Note, supra note 3, § 3. The U.K. Registrar welcomed this development.
Id. § 6.
20. This is apparent in the Directive's preamble. For example, the third recital
provides:
Whereas the establishment and functioning of an internal market in which,
in accordance with Article 7a of the Treaty, the free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital is ensured require not only that personal data
should be able to flow freely from one Member State to another, but also
that the fundamental rights of individuals should be safeguarded.
Council Directive, supra note 13, at pmbl. recital 3.
21. Cf. Briefing Note, supra note 3, § 4.5 (discussing the Common Position, supra note
10).
22. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, Bundesverfassungsgericht (Fed. Const. Ct.), 65
BVerwGE 1, translated in 5 HuM. RTs. L.J. 94 (1984). See H. Prantl, Der Datenschutz
zehn Jahre nach dem Volkszdhlungsurteil: Unanstdndiges ftr unanstindigeLeute. Der spate
Sieg des ehemaligen Innenministers Friedrich Zimmermann, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Dec.
16, 1993.
23. See Hans-Hermann Schrader, Datenschutz in den Grundrechtskatalog, 1994
COMPUTER uNi REcHT 427.
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disclosure and use of such data for himself. These rights may be
limited only by a statute. [W]ithin the terms of statutory law,
everyone has a right to be told what information concerning him
is contained in files and databases and to view those files and
databases that concern him.24
The Data Protection Commissioner for the German state of Baden-
Wiirttemberg was quoted as saying that, "[d]ata protection.. . is the right
of every individual to decide fundamentally for himself, who may know
what about him and when."25
II. DATA PROTECTION IN THE DIRECTIVE
The Directive mandates a comprehensive control of processing of
information. This system includes:
" requirements of data quality (e.g., accuracy, but also limitations as to
purpose and time of retention)2'
" restrictions on permissible grounds for processing27
" prohibitions on processing sensitive data (e.g., race, ethnic origin,
etc.)25
* required notification to the data subject29
* limitations on disclosures to others30
* rights of the data subject to access to the data3'
* rights of the data subject to object to certain processing32
* requirements of levels of security33
* obligation to notify the supervisory authority of processing'
24. Id. at 428 (quoting Verfassung des Freistaats Thflringen [Const. of Thuringia] art.
6).
25. Prantl, supra note 22.
26. Council Directive, supra note 13, at art. 6.
27. Id. at art. 7.
28. Id. at art. 8.
29. Id. at arts. 10-11.
30. Id. at art. 12.
31. Id.
32. Id. at arts. 14-15.
33. Id. at arts. 16-17.
34. Id. at arts. 18-21.
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* private and public liability" and
• limitations on third-country transmission of personal data.3 6
The Directive applies its rules to government and private processing
alike. Where it applies, it requires positive authorization to process
information. Article 7 establishes, as a basic rule of prohibition, that
"Member States shall provide that personal data may be processed 'only
if" one of six conditions is met. 7 Most private party processing of
personal data, unless otherwise exempted, would be permissible only if
either Article 7(a), 7(b), or 7(f) is satisfied. Article 7(a) permits processing
where the information subject "has unambiguously given his consent."38
Article 7(b) permits processing "necessary for the performance of a
contract to which the data subject is party; or in order to take steps at the
request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract."39 Article 7(f)
permits processing if "necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests
of the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are dis-
closed, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject ..... I0 While the
operative legal concepts of Article 7(a) (collection with consent) and Article
7(b) (in preparation or performance of a contract) are fairly definite, those
of Article 7(f) are considerably more indefinite. The Directive offers scant
guidance in determining what interests are legitimate under Article 7(f) and
when they might be overridden by the interests of the data subject.41
III. BALANCING PRIVACY AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
The Directive balances competing interests in privacy protection and
freedom of information in three principal ways: (1) it exempts particular
activities from its application; (2) it authorizes Member States in their own
legislation to do the same in certain instances; and (3) it ameliorates
otherwise applicable requirements.
35. Id. at arts. 23-24.
36. Id. at arts. 23-26.
37. Id. at art. 7 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at art. 7(a).
39. Id. at art. 7(b).
40. Id. at art. 7(f).
41. The other provisions are 7(c) (to comply with law), 7(d) (to protect the data
subject), and 7(e) (to perform a task carried out in the public interest exercise of official
authority). Council Directive, supra note 13, at art. 7.
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A. Directive-Imposed Exemptions
1. Personal Data
One of the most important ways the Directive balances competing
interests of privacy and freedom of information is to limit its application
to "personal data."'42 The Directive has no application to other informa-
tion. Article 2(a) defines personal data to mean "any information relating
to an identified or identifiable natural person (data subject)."43 This means
that everyone may freely collect, process, and report information about
corporate bodies and groups of individuals where the individuals cannot be
identified. 44
2. Private and Personal Processing
Article 3(2) provides that the Directive shall not apply "to the
processing of personal data . . . by a natural person in the course of a
purely personal or household activity."45 In the minutes accompanying the
Common Position, the Council and the Commission emphasized that "the
expression 'purely personal or household activity' must not make it
possible to exclude from the scope of the Directive the processing of
personal data by a natural person, where such data are disclosed not to one
or more persons but to an indeterminate number of persons."' Since the
exemption also does not apply to the activities of corporate businesses, it
may have little effect in the protection of freedom of information.
3. Filing Systems, Not Files
An entry in the minutes that accompanied the Common Position
states, "The Council and Commission recognize that:-in line with the
current definition in Article 2(c), the Directive covers only filing systems,
42. This limitation has been a feature of all EU proposals since the first one in 1990
but is not a necessary feature of a data protection law.
43. Council Directive, supra note 13, at art. 2.
44. The preamble notes that "the principles of protection shall not apply to data
rendered anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable." Council
Directive, supra note 13, at pmbl. recital 26.
45. Council Directive, supra note 13, at art. 3(2).
46. Common Position, Statements for Entry in the Minutes, 4730/95 (quoting Council




not to files."' This statement creates confusion, because it is not at all
clear that the Directive is to apply only to filing systems and not to files.
Article 3(1) provides, "This Directive shall apply to the processing of
personal data wholly or partly by automatic means, and to the processing
otherwise than by automatic means of personal data which form part of a
file or are intended to form part of a filing system. ' The preamble
likewise suggests that it is only with respect to manual (for example,
noncomputerized) systems that the Directive applies-only to filing systems
and not to files.49
Limiting the Directive to filing systems of personal data and not
applying it to files generally that contain personal data would reduce the
burdens that the Directive imposes on freedom of information. 0 This
limitation means that the Directive would regulate only organized activities
of data processing directed to particular individuals; organized activities
that only incidentally affect individuals would remain unregulated. Thus,
a database on companies could incidentally include information on the
principal officers of the company without falling under the strictures of the
Directive. However, assuming that the Directive is to apply to "filing
systems" and not to "files" generally, technological developments may
overtake that limitation. If a database is searchable by an individual's




Article 9 provides that:
Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations from
the provisions of this Chapter [general rules], Chapter IV [third
47. Id.
48. Council Directive, supra note 13, at art. 3(1).
49. The 27th recital, for example, states, "as regards manual processing, this Directive
covers only filing systems, not unstructured files." Id. at pmbl. recital 27. The 15th recital
provides:
Whereas the processing of such data is covered by this Directive only if it
is automated or if the data processed are contained or intended to be
contained in a filing system structured according to specific criteria relating
to individuals, so as to permit easy access to the personal data in question.
Id. at pmbl. recital 15.
50. Qu6bec, Canada as a matter of statutory interpretation, seems to have taken this
approach with its data protection law. See Maxeiner, supra note 12, at 712.
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country transfer of data] and Chapter VI [supervisory authority]
for the processing of personal data carried out solely for
journalistic purposes or for the purpose of artistic or literary
creation only if they are necessary to reconcile the right of
privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression.51
This direction to the Member States to create exemptions for journalism is
the clearest example in the Directive of an attempt to balance protection of
privacy and freedom of information.52 The Directive itself, however,
gives no clear direction as to what the nature and the scope of these
exemptions ought to be.
The language limiting the authority of Member States to provide
exemptions "only if they are necessary" to reconcile the right to privacy
and freedom of expression was inserted after the U.K. Data Protection
Registrar had expressed her concern that the balance drawn should not fall
too much in favor of the media.53 She had commented that "getting the
balance right does not mean simply exempting the media from all data
protection controls" and had proposed language similar to that adopted as
a substitute for the more liberal language of the Common Position, which
had permitted Member States to make such exemptions as "prove
necessary. "s'
Getting the balance right is not an easy task. While the interest of free
expression is particularly strong in the case of journalism, so too is the
individual's interest in privacy. Because of the opportunities for broad
dissemination, it is especially likely that in the case of journalism,
individuals would be interested in, for example, a right to correction. On
the other hand, limiting exemptions to journalism leaves many activities
that should fall under freedom of information protection uncovered. The
51. Council Directive, supra note 13, at art. 9.
52. The 37th recital expressly recognizes freedom of information:
Whereas the processing of personal data for purposes of journalism or for
purposes of artistic expression, in particular in the audiovisual field, should
qualify for exemption from the requirements of certain provisions of this
Directive insofar as this is necessary to reconcile the fundamental rights of
individuals with freedom of information and notably the right to receive and
impart information, as guaranteed in particular in Article 10 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
Id. at pmbl. recital 37. Cf. Briefing Note, supra note 3, § 2 (calling this the "most
distinctive" balancing measure).
53. Briefing Note, supra note 3, § 5.4. The U.K. Data Protection Registrar is
Elizabeth, France.
54. Id. § 5.4. The Registrar's view was "[i]f exemptions are to present a proper
balance, they will need to be limited in extent." Id. § 4.4. The adopted language was close
to that which was proposed in the Briefing Note ("only so far as is necessary"). Id. § 5.4.
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usual definition of journalism is limited to print and broadcast media,5"
but freedom of expression is not a monopoly of journalism. The informa-
tion highway that has led to the felt need for data protection laws has
created new opportunities for communication which share aspects of
traditional journalism-or simply traditional free speech. For example, is
there a basis for treating on-demand, on-line information providers differ-
ently than the publications some of them carry?
2. General Exemptions to Particular Obligations
Article 13(1) authorizes Member States in certain instances to adopt
legislative measures to restrict the scope of certain obligations and rights;
namely, the obligations of data quality (Article 6(1)), the disclosure
obligations (Articles 10 and 11), the obligations to publicize data collection
(Article 21), and the right of access to data (Article 12).56 While most of
the instances in which Article 13 authorizes Member States to make
exemptions relate to public interests such as national security, it might be
used to support exemptions for freedom of information.' Subparagraph
(g) allows exemption for "the protection of the data subject or of the rights
and freedoms of others."58 There is little indication how, or if, Member
States will make use of Article 13 to protect freedom of information.
C. Modified Rules.
1. Sensitive Data
Article 8 is an instance where the Directive takes a generally
applicable rule and suspends or limits its operation and, thus, intentionally
or unintentionally promotes the interest of freedom of information. Article
8(1) requires that Member States pr6hibit processing of certain special
categories of data, such as those containing racial or ethnic information,
political or religious beliefs, and so forth. 9 Article 8(2) then requires
Member States to permit that processing in five specified instances.'
55. Cf. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 707 (1st ed.
1969).
56. Council Directive, supra note 13, at art. 13(1).
57. Cy. Briefing Note, supra note 3, § 4.4 (discussing Common Position, supra note 10,
at art. 13).
58. Council Directive, supra note 13, at art. 13.
59. Id. at art. 8(1).
60. Id. at art. 8(2).
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Article 8(2)(e)-one of the five enumerated instances where processing is
to be permitted-permits processing when "the processing relates to data
which are manifestly made public by the data subject or is necessary for the
establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.""
2. Disclosure Not Required in Certain Instances
Article 11(2) provides that Article 11(1), which requires disclosure to
the data subject that personal data has been processed, shall not apply
where "the provision of information proves impossible or involves a
disproportionate effort or if recording or disclosure is expressly laid down
by law."62 Article 11(2) gives statistical purposes and historical and
scientific research as examples of such instances but does not limit its
exception to these cases. How the Member States implement this exception
is important from a business perspective. A business that routinely
disseminates personal data might choose to locate its processing operations
in a Member State that exempts its operations from that prior notification
requirement rather than settle in a Member State where notification is de-
manded in every case. Such a result, of course, runs counter to the
Common Position's goal of achieving a single European market.
CONCLUSION
The Directive makes attempts to balance protection of privacy and
freedom of information. In many instances, it does this by authorizing
Member States to provide exemptions and derogations in their individual
legislation. The question remains as to how the Member States of the
European Union will balance the competing interests of protection of
privacy and freedom of information. In drafting that legislation and in
amending existing legislation, Member States should accept that the need
to protect privacy in an Information Age should not lead to measures that
lose sight of the equally compelling need to encourage free exchange of
information, even when that information is classified as "personal data."
The actions of Member States should be of interest to the United States as
it formulates its own information policy.
61. Id. at art. 8(2)(e).
62. Id. at art. 11(2).
[Vol. 48
